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Abstract 
Establishment of the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants and audit market 
privatization as the new phenomenon in Iranian audit market is taken into consideration by many 
researchers. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of audit market privatization on 
auditor independence and accruals quality, and to study whether corporate governance mechanisms 
(duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors, the number of changes in board of directors and 
the change of CEO) can affect above relations. We test research hypothesis in listed firms on Tehran 
Stock Exchange (TSE) for the period of 2001 to 2011. Using multiple regression analysis, we have 
found that audit market privatization is negatively associated with auditor independence and 
accruals quality. Also, corporate governance mechanisms don’t decrease the negative relation 
between audit market privatization, auditor independence and accruals quality. This paper extends 
the audit market literature by examining how increased competition in the audit market affects 
auditor independence and accruals quality in emerging markets. 
Keywords: Audit Privatization, Auditor Independence, Corporate Governance, Accruals 
Quality 
 
Introduction 
Financial statements are the easy and cheap way to access the information of companies. 
Since managers’ interests depend to performance of company and also managers prepare the 
financial statements, it provides incentives and opportunities for them to manipulate financial results 
(Klimentchenko, 2009). Audit services are demanded as monitoring devices to detect the vast 
majority of distortions and verify the undistorted information (Elliott and Jacobson, 1999). Audit 
increase the reliability of financial information by decreasing the noise contained in financial 
statements. Auditor monitoring strength is determined by the auditors’ ability to provide objective 
reports. Competence and independence of auditor are the measures of auditor’s monitoring 
effectiveness (Li, 2007). Independent auditors can identify misstatements in financial statements and 
exert pressure on the client to correct those misstatements (DeAngelo 1981). As a result of reducing 
accounting misstatements, the audited financial statements show higher quality (Chambers and 
Payne, 2011). Auditor independence improves the reliability of the auditor’s report in two ways. 
First, auditor independence increases the credibility of published financial reports and adds value to 
stakeholders. The second, auditor independence by decreasing information asymmetry and 
increasing the information transparency, improve the information quality (Li, 2007).  The issue of 
auditor independence is important because much of relations in the capital markets depend on the 
credibility of the audited financial statements (Anandarajan et al, 2010). Brown et al (2009) 
addresses the question whether auditor independence affect the earnings quality. They find the 
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positive relation between the auditor independence and earnings quality. Also, Meuwissen et al 
(2003) examine the relation of auditor independence regulation and earnings quality in the US. Their 
results indicate that with increasing the strength of auditor independence regulation, information 
content of accruals increase and earnings management decrease. 
Concentration or competition in markets always takes into consideration of economists. 
Based on the most of economic theory competition in markets improve the quality and decease the 
price of goods and services. But according to economic theory of customer switching cost 
competition, in some service industries such as audit (that relationships of customer and service 
providers are long-term, switching customer requires high transactions costs and client specific 
knowledge is necessary) probably increasing the competition in market decrease the quality of 
services. Because competition in audit market increase the number of audit firms and auditors 
inclined to retain their clients; so, they may accept questionable accounting treatments of clients 
(Harris and Duellman, 2008).  
Privatization of Iran audit market lead to establishment of private audit firms, increase the 
number of audit firms and competition in this market. Accordingly, it seems that audit market 
privatization may declines the auditor independence and quality of financial statements. The main 
purpose of this paper is studying the effectiveness of audit privatization plan in Iran and the role of 
the corporate governance strength on improvement the effectiveness of audit privatization. The 
result of this study in several aspects important: first, this paper is to examine the effects of the 
privatization of Iranian audit market on auditor independence and financial statements quality by 
using information of firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). Second, the role of corporate 
governance as a mechanism of moderating the performance managers on the audit market 
privatization consequences is examined. Third, this paper adds new evidences about audit market 
privatization in capital markets of developing countries. Finally, these results can direct legislators 
and standards setter and provide the pattern for other capital market in Middle-East.  
This study seeks to provide answer these questions: First, did the audit privatization reduce 
the accruals quality? Second, did the audit privatization distort the auditor independence? Third, did 
corporate governance mechanisms affect the relation between audit market privatization and the 
accruals quality? Fourth, did corporate governance mechanisms affect the relation between audit 
market privatization and the auditor independence?   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section explains theoretical 
framework and literature review. Section 3 presents hypothesis development. Section 4 contains 
sample selection. Section 5 explains research design. Section 6 presents and discusses the empirical 
results of research. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
Literature Review 
Audit Market Privatization, Auditor Independence and Quality of Financial Statements  
Before Islamic revolution in 1979, KPMG, Winney Merry, Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young 
and Deloitte had participated in Iranian audit market as major audit firms. After Iranian revolution, 
the ownership of all banks and insurance firms and many industrial companies were transferred to 
government control. During 1980–1982, the government established audit firms and the Budget, 
Planning and National Industries Organization. In 1987, following the merger of the public-sector 
audit firms, the Audit Organization was established as the sole auditor of entities with public 
ownership and as the only regulatory body for national accounting and auditing standards. The 
Audit Organization is responsible for compiling and determining principles and rules of auditing and 
accounting in Iran (Banimahd and Vafaei, 2012). 
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In 2001, Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants (IACPA) was established. 
Since that time, IACPA members are permitted to establish private audit firms and provide audit 
services. Audit market privatization causes to presence of private audit firms in this market. As a 
result, ratio of auditor change and competition in audit market increase. The extent of economic 
consequences of this phenomenon causes the new concerns and questions for capital market 
practitioners. For example, based on economic theory of customer switching cost, competition in 
audit market leads to destroying the auditor independence and subsequently distorting the financial 
statements. Consistent with the expectations Harris and Duellman (2008) find competition in audit 
market decline the quality of financial statements. Also, Kallapur et al (2008) achieve to similar 
results. Francis et al (2013), by studying audit markets in 42 countries, address the question whether 
concentration of audit market decrease earnings quality of clients. The research results indicate 
dominance of Big 4 doesn’t harm audit quality and earnings quality. Jensen and Payne (2003) study 
the effects of price competition on the audit market. They conclude competition in audit market 
decrease audit fees, delete the expertise premia, inclined to unskilled audit firms and exit Big 6 audit 
firms. Newton et al (2013) investigate the relation of audit market competition and financial 
restatements due to defeats in the application of GAAP. Their results indicate high auditor 
competition increase the probable of financial restatements. Unlike our expectations, Yang et al 
(2001) investigate the consequences of disaffiliation of CPA firms from government bodies in 
China. They show that disaffiliation program improve the auditor independence. Also, Gul et al 
(2009) find after performing this program the likelihood of receiving a qualified report as a measure 
of auditor independence significantly increased.  
On the other hand, some researchers believe large audit firms present more quality services. 
Two arguments to this issue are presented. First, DeAngelo (1981) argues larger audit firms have 
more incentive to issue accurate reports because they have more to lose from failure to detect and 
report the important misstatements of clients. Moreover, Dye (1993) argues larger audit firms have 
more wealth at risk from litigation because they have deeper pocket (Li et al, 2008). DeFond et al 
(2000) examine the impacts of implementing rigorous new auditing standards in China. Their results 
show since larger auditors have more loss if they are found to be in violation of auditing standards, it 
expects that larger auditors to be relatively more independent than smaller auditors. Li et al (2008) 
indicate the positive relations between audit firm size and audit quality.  
Corporate Governance and Quality of Financial Statements 
The corporate governance mechanism includes the system by which organizations are 
directed and controlled and hence, it determines to implement the internal and external process and 
policy. Corporate governance mechanisms improve financial reporting quality and decrease the risk 
of financial reporting problems (Hashim and Devi, 2008). Therefore, the quality of financial 
statements can be affected by corporate governance mechanisms. Jiang et al (2008) argue that weak 
corporate governance increase the probable of earnings management. Abdullah (2004) suggests 
strong governance practices improve the reliability of financial reports.  
Xie et al (2003) investigate the effect of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the 
executive committee as the mechanisms of corporate governance on earnings management. They 
find the composition of a board and audit committee meeting frequency decrease earnings 
management. Lin and Liu (2009) show strong corporate governance (such as the ownership 
concentration, the size of the supervisory board and the duality of CEO and chairman of board of 
directors) lead to choose high quality auditors. Soliman and Elsalam (2012) examine the 
effectiveness of corporate governance practices and their relations to audit quality and conclude 
board independence; CEO duality and audit committees significantly associate with audit quality, 
but institutional investor and managerial ownership have no significant relationship with audit 
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quality. Hashim and Devi (2008) study the effect of internal governance mechanisms on earnings 
quality. Their results show that board tenure and outside board ownership have significant relation 
with earnings quality. But there isn’t any significant relation between board of directors’ 
independence and earnings quality.  Shiri et al (2012) examine the relation of the composition of the 
board of the non-bound directors, absent from the CEO as chairman or vice chairman and 
institutional investors as the corporate governance mechanisms and accrual quality, persistence and 
predictability as the measures of earning quality in Iran. They conclude the ratio of non-bound 
members, separation of the chairman or vice chairman and the percentages of institutional investors 
are associated with earnings persistent. Also, there is the significant relationship between the ratio of 
non-bound members and predictability of earnings. Moreover, the percentage of institutional 
investors is associated with accrual's quality. 
According to the negative effect of audit market privatization on earnings quality, it seems 
the strong corporate governance can reduce this negative effect and improve the earnings quality. In 
this study duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors, the number of changes in board of 
directors and the change of CEO are used as the corporate governance mechanisms.      
 
Hypothesis Development 
Privatization as the new phenomenon in the audit market in Iran may have important 
economic consequences. With performing the audit market privatization plan and establishment of 
private audit firms, monopoly of Audit Organization as the only audit firm ended and small auditor 
enter to audit market. According to studies, small audit firms probably present lower quality audit. 
Also, presence of private audit firms increases the competition in this market. Auditor competition 
may destroy auditor independence and auditor ignores the misstatement of clients. So, the quality of 
financial statements is diminished. Before privatization, Audit Organization was only audit 
institution, so without concern about missing the client, issued its actual opinion. But after 
establishment of the Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants and enforce the 
privatization plan, private audit firms in order to retain clients may compromise their independence 
and quality of clients financial statements is decreased. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Audit market privatization decreases the accruals quality. 
H2: Audit market privatization decreases the auditor independence.  
With agency conflict between management and company’s stakeholders, the existence of 
monitoring devices is necessary. Although independent auditors mostly play this role, the internal 
corporate governance mechanisms can help to reduce information asymmetry and improve the 
reliability and transparency of financial statements. Considering our expectations about reducing the 
auditor independence and accruals quality by audit market privatization and the effect of monitoring 
corporate governance mechanisms, we hypothesize that:  
H3: strong corporate governance decreases the negative effect of audit market privatization 
on accruals quality. 
H4: strong corporate governance decreases the negative effect of audit market privatization 
on auditor independence. 
 
Sample Selection 
Our sample covers companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) across the period from 
2001 to 2011. The sample selection criteria are: 
1. The end of fiscal year is March 2001; 
2. The end of fiscal year aren’t change over the period of 2001-2011; 
3. Their basic operations aren’t investment, insurance and banking ; 
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4. Book value of assets aren’t negative; 
5. Data is available in this period.  
Given to above criteria, final sample included 111 firms. 
 
Research Design  
In this paper we used four multiple regressions for the test of hypotheses presented. Because 
of heteroskedastic error, all regressions are estimated in GLS method. Accruals quality is used as the 
quality of financial statements. For calculating accruals quality, the model described by McNichols 
(2002) is estimated cross-sectionally. Then, standard deviation of residuals estimated from this 
regression is applied as a measure of earnings management. Since the high standard deviation of 
residuals represents low accruals quality, it is multiplied by (-1).  
 
   (1) 
 
Where, ti,WC is the change in non-cash working capital, ti,CFO is the operating cash flow, 
ti,REV is the change in firm sales and ti,PPE is the gross property, plant and equipment. 
In order to examine the effect of audit market privatization on the accruals quality, model (2) 
is estimated. 
ti,ti,9ti,8ti,7
ti,6ti,5ti,4ti,3ti,2ti,10ti,
εLossαROAαBTMα
growthαLEVαCFOαSizeαTenureαPrivateααEQ


   (2)
 
Where, EQ  is accruals quality explained above, Private is the dummy variable that set 1 if 
firm changes its auditor from Audit Organization to private audit firms, but 0 otherwise, ti,Tenure is 
the tenure of audit in firm’s client, Size is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets, CFO is 
the operating cash flow scaled by beginning total assets, LEV is the leverage of company is 
calculated by sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by beginning total assets, 
growth  is the change in revenues scaled by beginning total assets, BTM is the Book-to-Market 
ratio (Company market value is calculated by liability book value plus equity market value), ROA is 
return on assets, Loss is the dummy variable equal to 1 if earnings is negative, equal to 0 otherwise.  
In order to examine the relation between audit market privatization and auditor 
independence, model (3) is estimated. 
ti,t,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2ti,10t,i LossROALevSizeTenurePrivate Influe      (3) 
ti,Influe :client influence on auditor as a measure of auditor independence that is determined 
as follow: 
Like to Chambers and Payne (2011) client influence is calculated by ratio of the client’s 
audit fees to the total audit fees earned by this audit firm. Because audit fees aren’t available for all 
companies and there is high correlation between audit fees and total assets, for calculations of client 
influence measure, total assets are used instead of audit fees.  
In order to investigate the role of corporate governance mechanisms on the relation between 
audit market privatization and accruals quality, model (4) is used. 
ti,ti,11ti,10ti,9ti,8ti,7ti,6ti,5
ti,4titi,3ti2ti,10ti,
εLossαROAαBTMαgrowthαLEVαCFOαSizeα
TenureαovernanceG*PrivateαovernanceGαPrivateααEQ

 ,,
    (4)
 
overnanceG  is the measure of corporate governance. Duality of CEO and chairman of board 
of directors, the number of changes in board of directors and the change of CEO are used as three 
itit5it41ti,3it21-ti,10it ε PPE  REV  CFO  CFO CFO    WC   
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index of corporate governance. So, model (4) is estimated three times separately for each corporate 
governance variable.  
Finally, for examine the fourth hypothesis, model(5)is estimated.  According to the latest 
hypothesis, the interaction effect of  duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors, the number 
of changes in board of directors and the change of CEO (as the measures of corporate governance) 
and privatization on auditor independence are tested. 
ti,ti,8ti,7ti,6ti,5
ti,4ti,ti,3ti,2ti,10ti,
εLossαROAαLevαSizeα
TenureαGovernance*Private αGovernance αPrivate ααInflue


         (5)
 
 
Results  
Table 1 presents the sample means, median and standard deviations. The mean of 
privatization is 0.657 shows that 65.7% of the sample companies are audited by private audit firms. 
On the other word only 34.3% of the sample companies are audited by Audit Organization. These 
results indicate the share of Audit Organization in audit market has been decreased gradually. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Mean Median  Std. Deviation 
EQ  -1.377 -0.507 2.134 
Private 0.657 1 0.474 
Tenure  3.651 3  2.601  
Size  12.929 12.764  1.305  
CFO  0.24 0.162  0.508  
LEV  0.246 0.226  0.164  
growth  0.136 0.107  0.457  
BTM  0.784 0.780  0.952  
ROA  0.132 0.105  0.125  
Loss  0.058 0  0.234  
Influe 0.137 0.026 0.251 
IND 0.794 1 0.404 
 
Model (1) examines the effect of audit market privatization on accruals quality. The results 
of the estimation of this model are shown in Table 2. The coefficient of privatization is -0.304 and 
significant. So, it was found that audit market privatization decrease the accruals quality. Z-statistics 
of this variable is -3.94.  
Table 2. Regression of Accruals Quality on Privatization 
ti,ti,9ti,8ti,7ti,6
ti,5ti,4ti,3ti,2t10ti,
εLossαROAαBMTαgrowthα
LEVαCFOαSizeαTenureαPrivateααEQ

  
Variables Coefficients z-statistics p-value Wald-statistics (p-value) 
Private -0.304 -3.94 0.000 
84.60 
(0.000) 
Tenure  -0.403 -3.04 0.002 
Size  -0.076 -2.98 0.003 
CFO  -0.111 -2.17 0.030 
LEV  0.781 3.74 0.000 
growth  -0.076 -0.76 0.449 
BTM  -0.038 -1.13 0.260 
ROA  -1.742 -4.37 0.000 
Loss  -0.210 -1.61 0.108 
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Model (2) tests whether audit market privatization decrease auditor independence. The obtained 
results are reflected in Table 3. The coefficient of privatization is 0.125 and z-statistics is 0.000; that 
is, audit market privatization increase the client influence on auditor and decrease auditor 
independence.   
Table 3. Regression of Auditor Independence on Privatization 
ti,t,iLoss6t,iROA5t,iLev4t,iSize3t,iTenure2ti,Private 10t,iInflue    
Variables Coefficients z-statistics p-value Wald-statistics (p-value) 
Private 0.125 19.24 0.000 
442.14 
(0.000) 
Tenure -0.004 -4.79 0.000 
Size 0.016 7.59 0.000 
Lev 0.001 0.09 0.930 
ROA -0.007 -0.28 0.776 
Loss -0.013 -0.88 0.379 
 
Table 4. Regression of corporate governance effect on the relation between 
Privatization and Accruals Quality 
ti,ti,11ti,10ti,9ti,8ti,7ti,6ti,5
ti,4titi,3ti2ti,10ti,
εLossαROAαBTMαgrowthαLEVαCFOαSizeα
TenureαovernanceG*PrivateαovernanceGαPrivateααEQ

 ,,
 duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors 
The number of changes 
in board of directors The change of CEO 
Variables Coefficients (z-statistics) 
Coefficients 
(z-statistics) 
Coefficients 
(z-statistics) 
Private -0.378
*
(-5.17) 
-0.418*
(-4.55) 
-0.363*
(-3.93) 
Governance 0.313 (0.67) 
-0.022 
(-0.60) 
-0.103 
(-0.82) 
Private* Governance 0.144 (0.29) 
0.020 
(0.44) 
0.040 
(0.26) 
Tenure  -0.036
*
(-2.88) 
-0.040*
(-3.09) 
-0.050*
(-3.53) 
Size  -0.058
*
(-2.48)
-0.056*
(-2.33)
-0.113*
(-4.03)
CFO  -0.116
*
(-2.45) 
-0.114*
(-2.33) 
-0.108 
(-1.86) 
LEV  0.804
*
(3.89) 
0.860*
(4.16) 
0.713*
(2.99) 
growth  -0.097 (-0.99) 
-0.065 
(-0.63) 
-0.169 
(-1.27) 
BTM  -0.036 (-1.13) 
-0.029 
(-1.12) 
-0.042 
(-1.27) 
ROA  -1.321
*
(-3.21) 
-1.325*
(-3.22) 
-2.022*
(-4.61) 
Loss  -0.154 (-1.21) 
-0.097 
(-0.74) 
-0.318*
(-2.12) 
Wald chi2 -statistics 
(p-value) 
85.12 
(0.000) 
84.42 
(0.000) 
95.42 
(0.000) 
* Significant at 5%  
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Third hypothesis provide empirical evidence on effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
on the relation between audit market privatization and accruals quality. Model (3) tests this 
hypothesis and its’ results are presented in Table 4. We used three variables as the measures of 
corporate governance: duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors, the number of changes in 
board of directors and the change of CEO. Then, model (3) is estimated three times. Table 4 
indicates the coefficients of privatization like to model (1) negative and significant (-0.378, -0.418 
and -0.363). The coefficients of duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors, the number of 
changes in board of directors and the change of CEO respectively are 0.313, -0.022 and -0.103. The 
interaction coefficients of privatization and duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors, the 
number of changes in board of directors and the change of CEOrespectively are 0.144, 0.02 and 
0.04. But then one of corporate governance variables and the interaction coefficients of corporate 
governance variables and privatization are significant.  
 
Table 5 shows the results obtained from estimation of model (4), which investigates the 
effect of each corporate governance variable on relation between audit privatization and the auditor 
independence. Similar to model (3), this model is estimated separately for each corporate 
governance variable. Consistent with the notion, the coefficients of privatization are 0.125, 0.131 
and 0.119 and significant. The coefficients of duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors, the 
number of changes in board of directors and the change of CEO respectively in this regression are -
0.007, -0.0006 and 0.001. The interaction coefficients of privatization and duality of CEO and 
chairman of board of directors, the number of changes in board of directors and the change of CEO 
respectively are 0.0009, -0.003 and -0.022. Like to model (3) corporate governance variables and the 
interaction coefficients of corporate governance variables and privatization aren’t significant.  
 
Table 5. Regression of corporate governance effect on the relation between Privatization 
and Auditor Independence 
ti,ti,8ti,7ti,6ti,5
ti,4ti,ti,3ti,2ti,10ti,
εLossαROAαLevαSizeα
TenureαGovernance*Private αGovernance αPrivate ααInflue


 
 duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors 
The number of changes in 
board of directors The change of CEO 
Variables Coefficients (z-statistics) Coefficients (z-statistics) Coefficients (z-statistics) 
Private 0.125
*
(18.31) 
0.131*
(14.01) 
0.119*
(15.17) 
Governance -0.007 (-0.62) 
-0.0006 
(-0.25) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
Private* 
Governance 
0.0009 
(0.03) 
-0.003 
(-0.78) 
-0.022 
(-1.61) 
Tenure  -0.005
*
(-4.80) 
-0.005*
(-4.85) 
-0.007*
(-6.47) 
Size  0.016
*
(6.66) 
0.018*
(7.04) 
0.016*
(8.92) 
LEV  -0.0006 (-0.00) 
-0.004 
(-0.21) 
0.011 
(0.50) 
ROA -0.012 (-0.45)
-0.012 
(-0.39)
0.007 
(0.25)
Loss  -0.013 (-0.90) 
-0.011 
(-0.74) 
-0.005 
(-0.37) 
Wald chi2 -statistics 
(p-value) 
424.15 
(0.000) 
390.96 
(0.000) 
342.86 
(0.000) 
* Significant at 5%  
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Conclusion and remarks 
Audit Organization as only institute to provide audit services in Iran was established in 1987. 
But in 2001 with establishment of Iranian Association of Certified Public Accountants (IACPA), 
private audit firms were allowed to provide audit services. This event is named audit privatization 
and it is expected affects audit market and capital market considerably. This paper seeks to provide 
evidence on the effects of audit market privatization on accruals quality. The results of this study 
indicate audit market privatization reduce the accruals quality; that is, accruals quality of companies 
audited by Audit Organization is more than the companies audited by private audit firms. Also, audit 
market privatization destroys the auditor independence. Therefore, we can argue audit market 
privatization with increasing the number of audit firms (that some of them are small and have lower 
experience than Audit Organization managers) in order to retain their client, don’t enforce client to 
adjust the misstatements in their financial reports. Therefore, quality of financial reports decrease. 
These results is consistent with the result of Newton et al (2013), Harris and Duellman (2008), 
Kallapur et al (2008) and Jensen and Payne (2003) but against to Gul et al (2009) and Yang et al 
(2001).    
The other results of this research is that duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors, 
the number of changes in board of directors and the change of CEO as the measures of corporate 
governance don’t improve the accruals quality and auditor independence. Furthermore, these 
corporate governance variables can’t decline the negative consequence of audit market privatization 
on auditor independence and accruals quality.  
These results contribute the existing literature about the consequences of audit market 
privatization in the emerging market. This research reveals the audit market privatization has not 
been successful to achieve the underlying intent of this plan in Iran. Regarding to inefficiency of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms in Iran, legislators should concentrate on improvement of 
independent audit quality. Accordingly, legislators and standards setter should issue some acts and 
standards to restrict fraud and misstatements of managers and protect the outside users.   
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